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THE AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES ACT, SECTION 504,
AND CHURCH-RELATED
INSTITUTIONS
JOHN A. LIEKWEG*
The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990' ("ADA") and
the Rehabilitation Act of 19732 address discrimination on the
basis of a disability. These statutes provide minimum guidelines
to ensure that entities subject to the statutes provide for the
needs of persons with disabilities. The two Acts often interrelate
when applied to church-related institutions. These legal re-
quirements impact the role of the Church as educator, employer,
and provider of public services. This Article discusses the rights
of individuals with disabilities and the legal obligations of
church-related institutions to these individuals.3
Part I of this Article gives a broad overview of the ADA and
discusses the obligations church-related institutions may have as
employers and providers of public services. Part II discusses
section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 as applied to church
institutions as educators and employers. This Article concludes
that while it is important for church-related institutions to en-
sure compliance with these statutes, there also exists a moral
dimension with regard to how church-affiliated institutions
* Associate General Counsel, United States Catholic Conference.
1 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994). See discussion infra Part I, A-D.
2 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1994). See discussion infra Part II, A-C.
State laws prohibiting discrimination on the basis of disability are beyond the
scope of this article. These laws, however, must be considered when analyzing is-
sues in this area.
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should relate to persons with disabilities. Consistent with the
Church's teachings,4 our ultimate goal should be to find ways to
enable Catholic institutions to become more inclusive and open
to persons with disabilities, rather than simply counseling them
on the minimum requirements of the law.
I. AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT (ADA)
A. General Overview
The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 was enacted on
July 26, 1990.' Its stated purposes include providing (i) "a clear
and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of dis-
crimination against individuals with disabilities" 6 and (ii) "to
provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards address-
ing discrimination against individuals with disabilities."7
Structurally, the ADA consists of five titles.8 Generally, Ti-
See generally Joseph N. Perry, Rights in Canon Law for Persons with Mental
Disabilities, 33 CATH. LAW. 131 (1990); Guidelines for the Celebration of the Sacra-
ments with Persons with Disabilities, 25 ORIGINS 105 (1995); Pastoral Statement on
the Handicapped, 8 ORIGINS 372 (1978).
5 The Act became effective on July 26, 1992. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111 (1994);
Brown v. General Tel. Co., 108 F.3d 208, 209 (9th Cir. 1997); see also H.R. REP. No.
101-485 (II), at 23 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 267, 304 (effective date of
Title I is two years from enactment).
While Title I became effective on July 26, 1992, see Morrison v. Carleton
Woolen Mills, Inc., 108 F.3d 429, 443 (1st Cir. 1997); Graehling v. Village of Lom-
bard, 58 F.3d 295, 296 (7th Cir. 1995); Burfield v. Brown, Moore & Flint, Inc., 51
F.3d 583, 588 (5th Cir. 1995), courts are split as to the date when Title II became
effective. See Norman-Bloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley Lab., No. 96-16526, 1998 U.S.
App. LEXIS 1398, at *9 (9th Cir. Feb. 3, 1998) (finding that Title II became effective
on January 26, 1992); Holbrook v. City of Alpharetta, 112 F.3d 1522, 1529 (11th Cir.
1997) (determining that Title II became effective on the same date Title I became
effective).
6 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (1994). See Bledsoe v. Palm Beach County Soil & Wa-
ter Conservation Dist., No. 96-5375, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 888, at *11 (11th Cir.
Jan. 22, 1998); Duda v. Board of Educ., No. 97-2457, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 700, at
*10 (7th Cir. Jan. 16, 1998); Gerdes v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc., 125 F.3d 634, 637 (8th
Cir. 1997); Lightbourn v. County of El Paso, 118 F.3d 421, 430 (5th Cir. 1997), cert.
denied, 118 S. Ct. 700 (1998); Jacques v. Clean-up Group, 96 F.3d 506, 510 (1st Cir.
1996).
7 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(2) (1994). See Bryant v. Better Bus. Bureau of Greater
Md., Inc., 923 F. Supp. 720, 732 (D. Md. 1996); Stola v. Joint Indus. Bd., 889 F.
Supp. 133, 136 (S.D.N.Y. 1995); Raya v. Maryatt Indus., 829 F. Supp. 1169, 1174
(N.D. Cal. 1993).
8 For the text of the original Act, see Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990,
Pub. L. No. 101-336, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. (104 Stat.) 327. The original Act
was divided into five titles. Most of the ADA is now found at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-
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tle I prohibits discrimination in employment practices on the
basis of a disability.9 Title II prohibits discrimination in the
provision of state and local government programs and services,
including public transportation.'0 Title III prohibits discrimina-
tion against individuals with disabilities in places of public ac-
commodation and with regard to private services providers."
Title IV, amended by the Communications Act of 1934,12 was en-
acted to improve telecommunications services for hear-
ing-impaired and speech-impaired individuals. 13 Title V contains
rules of statutory construction and other miscellaneous provi-
sions. 4 In terms of the ADA's application to Catholic institu-
tions, Title I, prohibiting discrimination in employment prac-
tices, is most directly relevant. Title II and Title III are also of
importance and must be considered. Each of these Titles is dis-
cussed briefly below.
B. Title I - Employment
The general rule under Title I provides that "[n]o covered
entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual ... be-
cause of the disability of such individual." 5 This applies to all
12213 (1994). Title IV of the original act, however, can be found at 47 U.S.C. § 225
(1994) and 47 U.S.C. § 611 (1994).
" See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117 (1994). See generally Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr.,
The Americans with Disabilities Act: Analysis and Implications of a Second-
Generation Civil Rights Statute, 26 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 413, 454-64 (1991);
Nancy L. Jones, Overview and Essential Requirements of the Americans with Dis-
abilities Act, 64 TEMPLE L. REV. 471, 481-84 (1991); Bonnie P. Tucker, The Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act of 1990: An Overview, 22 N.M. L. REV. 13, 25-48 (1992);
Robin Andrews, Comment, The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990: New Legis-
lation Creates Expansive Rights for the Disabled and Uncertainties for Employers,
21 CUMB. L. REV. 629, 639-46 (1991).
10 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12165 (1994). See generally Burgdorf, Jr., supra note
9, at 464-470; Jones, supra note 9, at 484-485; Tucker, supra note 9, at 50-64.
" See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181-12189 (1994). See generally Paul Sullivan, Note, The
Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990: An Analysis of Title III and Applicable
Case Law, 29 SUFFOLK U. L. REV 1117 (1995); Burgdorf, Jr., supra note 9, at 470-81;
Jones, supra note 9, at 485-86; Tucker, supra note 9, at 70-93; Andrews, supra note
9, at 632-634.
12 See 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-612 (1994).
1" The two amendments to the Communications Act of 1934, definitions and
closed-captioning of public service announcements, were codified at 47 U.S.C. § 225
(1994) and 47 U.S.C. § 611 (1994), respectively.
'" See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12201-12213 (1994).
"r 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). See Ashley S. Heron, Note, The Americans with Dis-
abilities Act: Who Can Claim Its Protection?, 48 ALA. L. REv. 1023, 1023-24 (1997)
(discussing who is a "qualified individual").
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aspects of the employment relationship, including recruiting and
application procedures. 6 Covered employers17 are required to
make reasonable accommodations for the known disabilities of
applicants and employees unless this concession would cause
undue hardship."8
Title I contains two provisions specifically directed at relig-
ious entities. The first provision is modeled after the current ex-
emption in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. This provi-
sion allows religious organizations to give preference to members
of their own denominations with regard to employment deci-
sions." The second provision allows religious organizations to
require that employees and applicants conform to the religious
tenets of the organization. 2' For example, such a provision might
be applied where an organization has a rule against the use of
alcohol or illegal drugs.
An additional aspect of Title I, however, is unique to relig-
ious organizations. Legislative history indicates that Title I of
16 See id.
17 Employers covered by the ADA are those who are "engaged in an industry af-
fecting commerce who [have] 15 or more employees for each working day in each of
20 or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year ...." 42 U.S.C. §
12111(5)(A). Individuals who do not meet the definition of "employer" are not liable
under the ADA. See Fedor v. Illinois Dep't of Employment Sec., 955 F. Supp. 891,
894 (N.D. Ill. 1996); see also Gonzales v. Garner Food Servs., Inc., 89 F.3d 1523,
1525 n.6 (l1th Cir. 1996), reh'g denied sub noma. Thomas v. Garner Food Servs., Inc.
104 F.3d 373 (11th Cir. 1996), cert. denied sub noma. Wood v. Garner Food Servs.,
Inc. 117 S. Ct. 1822 (1997) (holding that former employee still receiving health
benefits did not qualify for protection under ADA); DeVito v. Chicago Park Dist., 83
F.3d 878, 880 (7th Cir. 1996) (determining that an individual who was reinstated in
1992 after a 1989 dismissal was an "employee" and thus protected under the ADA).
18 A "reasonable accommodation" is defined to include "making existing facilities
used by employees readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities
... " 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(A), and "job restructuring, part-time or modified work
schedules, reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or modification of equip-
ment or devices, appropriate adjustment or modifications of examinations, training
materials or policies, the provision of qualified readers or interpreters, and other
similar accommodations for individuals with disabilities." 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B).
"Undue hardship" is defined as "an action requiring significant difficulty or ex-
pense" that requires consideration of at least four factors. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(A).
These factors include, "the nature and cost of the accommodation," 42 U.S.C. §
12111(10)(B)(i); "the overall financial resources of the facility ... [and] the effect on
expenses and resources," 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(B)(ii); the overall financial re-
sources, size of business, and "number type and location" of the facilities of the cov-
ered entity, 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(B)(iii); and "the type of operation or operations of
the covered entity .... " 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10)(B)(iv).
19 See 42 U.S.C. § 12113(c)(1).
20 See 42 U.S.C. § 12113(c)(2).
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the ADA is to be interpreted in a manner consistent with Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as it applies to the employ-
ment relationship between a religious organization and those
who minister on its behalf.21 Beginning with McClure v. Salva-
tion Army," courts have consistently interpreted Title VII as not
applying to the relationship between a minister and his or her
congregation.23 Therefore, for example, it is unlikely that Title I
of the ADA will be applied to situations concerning the assign-
ment of priests by a diocese or the selection of candidates for the
priesthood.
C. Title II - Public Services
Title II of the ADA prohibits discrimination on the basis of
disability (i) in the services, programs, and activities of all state
and local governments; 4 and (ii) in public transportation by bus
2 See H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, at 54 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 267,
336.
22 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1972). In McClure, the plaintiff was an officer, a posi-
tion equivalent to that of a minister, in the Salvation Army. The court below de-
termined that the Salvation Army was a "church" and the plaintiff an "ordained
minister." See McClure v. Salvation Army, 323 F. Supp. 1100, 1106 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
Plaintiff alleged that she was discharged due to her complaints to the EEOC that
she received less salary and benefits than male officers in similar positions. In
finding that the First Amendment barred application of Title VII to the relationship
between a church and its minister, the court stated, "[tihe relationship between an
organized church and its ministers is its lifeblood. The minister is the chief instru-
ment by which the church seeks to fulfill its purpose. Matters touching this rela-
tionship must necessarily be recognized as of prime ecclesiastical concern." Id. at
558-59.
See Young v. Northern Ill. Conference of United Methodist Church, 21 F.3d
184, 187 (7th Cir. 1994) (declining to review church's denial of an appointment as an
"elder" under the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment); Little v. Wuerl,
929 F.2d 944, 948 (3rd Cir. 1991) (finding that the application of Title VII to Catho-
lic schools would raise substantial constitutional questions); Scharon v. St. Luke's
Episcopal Presbyterian Hosp., 929 F.2d 360, 363 (8th Cir. 1991) (affirming a grant of
summary judgment for a church-affiliated hospital in suit brought by priest for age
and sex discrimination on First Amendment grounds); Natal v. Christian and Mis-
sionary Alliance, 878 F.2d 1575, 1577 (1st Cir. 1989) (finding an inquiry into church
rules, policies and decisions in wrongful termination action was barred by the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment); see also Weissman v. Congregation
Shaare Emeth, 38 F.3d 1038, 1044 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding that the ministry excep-
tion would not apply to non-clergy employees in suits arising under the Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act); Minker v. Baltimore Annual Conference of United
Methodist Church, 894 F.2d 1354, 1356 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (holding that consideration
of an age discrimination suit against church by minister would violate Free Exercise
clause).214 See 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (1994); see also Crawford v. Indiana Dep't of Correc-
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and rail, including inter-city and commuter rail. 25 The focus of
Title II is on government programs and public transportation
systems, therefore, Title II does not directly apply to private
nonprofit organizations.
Private nonprofit organizations, however, may be indirectly
affected by Subtitle A of Title II if they participate in state or lo-
cal programs as subcontractors, grantees or otherwise.26 The
regulations implementing Subtitle A specifically provide that, "in
providing any aid, benefit or service, [public entities] may not,
directly or through contractual, licensing, or other arrangements
... [d]eny a qualified individual with a disability the opportunity
to participate in or benefit from the aid, benefit, or service."27 In
addition, the regulations prohibit a public entity from providing
significant assistance to an organization that "discriminates on
the basis of disability in providing any aid, benefit, or service to
beneficiaries of the public entity's program."28 In administrative
practice, the word "significant" has been interpreted broadly to
include many types of direct or indirect assistance. 29 Taken from
tions, 115 F.3d 481, 487 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that the ADA protects state prison-
ers).2e See 42 U.S.C. § 12162 (1994).
26 Subtitle A has resulted in the application of Title II to a variety of situations
not directly controlled by the government. For a discussion on student athletics, see
Katie M. Burroughs, Learning Disabled Student Athletes: A Sporting Chance Under
the ADA?, 14 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POLY 57 (1997); John T. Wolohan, An Ethi-
cal and Legal Dilemma: Participation in Sports by HIV Infected Athletes, 7 MARQ.
SPORTS L.J. 373 (1997); Julia V. Kasperski, Comment, Disabled High School Ath-
letes and the Right to Participate: Are Age Waivers Reasonable Modifications Under
the Rehabilitation Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act?, 49 BAYLOR L. REV.
175 (1997). For issues in standardized testing, see Stanley S. Herr, Questioning the
Questionnaires: Bar Admissions and Candidates with Disabilities, 42 VILL. L. REV.
635 (1997); Diana C. Pullin and Kevin J. Heaney, The Use of "Flagged" Test Scores
in College and University Admissions: Issues and Implications Under Section 504 of
the Rehabilitation Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 23 J.C. & U.L. 797
(1997); Michael K. McKinney, Comment, The Impact of the Americans with Disabili-
ties Act on the Bar Examination Process: The Applicability of Title I and Title III to
the Learning Disabled, 26 CUMB. L. REV. 669 (1995-96). For an argument for the
application of section 12132 to assisted suicide, see Richard E. Coleson, The Glucks-
berg & Quill Amicus Curiae Briefs: Verbatim Arguments Opposing Assisted Suicide,
13 ISSUES L. & MED. 3, 101-102 (1997).
17 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(1)(i) (1997).
2 Id. § 35.130(b)(1)(v).
29 Administrative interpretations of the Act by an enforcing agency, although
not controlling on the courts, do constitute a "body of experience and informed
judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance." Meritor
Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986) (quoting General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert,
429 U.S. 125, 141-42 (1976), quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140
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the regulations implementing section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973, this provision will be discussed further below.30
Generally, the regulations under Title II and section 504 are
consistent.
As a result of their obligations under Title II, state and local
governmental agencies will likely require, by contract or grant
conditions, that any nonprofit organization participant mandate
a policy of nondiscrimination against, and provide accessible fa-
cilities to, disabled beneficiaries of publicly funded programs.
For example, a local government funding a soup kitchen or
similar type of public service, operated by a church or other pri-
vate organization, would likely require accessibility to individu-
als with disabilities.31 Similarly, the nondiscrimination require-
ments will apply to church-related institutions participating in
government programs, as they too are indirectly affected by Title
II and section 504.32
D. Title III - Public Accommodations and Services Operated by
Private Entities
As a general rule, Title III provides that "[n]o individual
shall be discriminated against on the basis of disability in the
full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privi-
leges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public ac-
commodation by any person who owns, leases (or leases to), or
(1944)). See Rivera v. Delta Airlines, No. Civ. A. 96-CV-1130, 1997 WL 634500, at *1
(E.D. Pa. 1997) (holding that in order to be held liable for providing significant as-
sistance, the assistance must go to the heart of the relationship between the two
parties) (citing Independent Hous. Serv. v. Fillmore Assocs., 840 F. Supp. 1328,
1344 (N.D. Cal. 1993)). In Fillmore, a public agency issued bonds for a housing proj-
ect, thus making it a part of a program or activity of the agency. Such a relationship
fulfilled the requirement of "significant" assistance, and therefore the ADA was held
applicable. See Fillmore, 840 F. Supp. at 1343-44.
30 See 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(f) (1997). ADA Title II incorporates the nondiscrimination
principles of section 504, extending them to state and local governments. See
McDonald v. Massachusetts, 901 F. Supp. 471, 478 (D. Mass. 1995) (citing Helen L.
v. DiDario, 46 F.3d 325, 331 (3d Cir. 1995)); see also Messier v. Southbury Training
Sch., 916 F. Supp. 133, 141 (D. Conn. 1996) (affirming congressional intent in
drafting the ADA as extending the provisions of section 504).
" See 28 C.F.R. §§ 35.149-151 (1997) (outlining accessibility requirements under
Title II).
2 The source of the funds, whether federal, state or local, does not affect the
application of Title II. Even if the public entity's program is fully funded with fed-
eral dollars, Title II applies, as well as section 504. If no federal funds are involved,
Title II still applies, but not section 504. See infra note 42 and accompanying text.
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operates a place of public accommodation.""3 The statute, in de-
fining a "public accommodation," enumerates twelve different
types of private entities encompassing hotels, restaurants, thea-
ters, lecture halls, stores, banks, attorney offices, hospitals, mu-
seums, amusement parks, private schools, health spas, day care
centers, homeless shelters, and social services agencies.34
At first glance, it appears that Title III applies to the major-
ity of Catholic institutions. This, however, is not the case. Sec-
tion 307 of Title III specifically excludes such institutions, pro-
viding that Title III "shall not apply ... to religious organizations
or entities controlled by religious organizations, including places
of worship."35  Published with Title III's final regulations, the
Justice Department's analysis takes the position that the relig-
ious exemption is very broad." As examples, it cites nursing
homes, schools, and day care centers operated by a church as
being exempt.3' Neither the regulations, nor the statute, define
the term "control" or the point at which exercise of control would
subject such an institution to the requirements of the ADA. No-
"s 42 U.S.C. § 12182 (1994); see Peter A. Susser, The ADA: Dramatically Ex-
panded Federal Rights for Disabled Americans, 16 EMPL. REL. L.J. 157, 169 (1994)
(noting significant implications of Title III of the ADA); see also Thomas P. Murphy,
Disabilities Discrimination Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 36 CATH.
LAW. 13, 32-37 (1995) (discussing the nuances of Title III and its application to relig-
ious organizations operating public accommodations).
34 See 42 U.S.C § 12181(7) (1994). The legislative history of the ADA, however,
clarifies that "'other similar' entities" does not include residential facilities. See H.R.
REP. NO. 101-485 (II), 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 383 (1990). It is important to note that
Title III only regulates private entities, not public entities; and it does not regulate
places. Title III applies if the defendant is (1) a private entity; and (2) owns, leases
or operates a place of public accommodation. See Ganden v. National Collegiate
Athletic Ass'n., 23 A.D.D. 1154, 1169, available in 1996 WL 680000 (N.D. Ill. 1996)
(holding parties may not escape the requirements of the ADA through multiple
ownership or management of a facility).
"' See 42 U.S.C. § 12187 (1994); 28 C.F.R. § 36.102(e) (1997) ("This part does not
apply to any private club (except to the extent that the facilities of the private club
are made available to customers or patrons of a place of public accommodation), or
to any religious entity or public entity.").
6 See Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability by Public Accommodations
and in Commercial Facilities, 56 Fed. Reg. 35,544, 35,554 (1991) (to be codified at 28
C.F.R. at 36) ("The ADA's exemption of religious organizations and religious entities
... is very broad ... [r]eligious organizations and entities controlled by religious or-
ganizations have no obligations under the ADA. Even [if] ... carr[ying] out activities
that would otherwise make it a public accommodation ....").
", See id. ("The religious entity would not lose its exemption merely because the
services provided were open to the general public."). See generally Murphy, supra
note 33, at 33; Tucker, supra note 9, at 75 (discussing the religious entity exemption
from Title III).
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tably, the operation of a school or social service agency by a
board of lay persons alone does not preclude the application of
the religious exemption.38 "The test remains a factual one,
whether the church or other religious organization controls the
operations of the school or of the service or whether the school or
service is itself a religious organization." 9
Finally, if a religious organization leases space to a public
accommodation, the public accommodation is responsible for en-
suring that its activities are in compliance with Title III's re-
quirements. ° To this end, it would be wise to insert a specific
reference in the lease agreement explicitly stating the lessee's
responsibility for compliance with the provisions of Title III.
II. SECTION 504 OF THE REHABILITATION ACT OF 1973
While church institutions such as schools and social service
agencies may be exempt from Title III of the ADA, they may be
subject to the requirements of section 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act of 1973."l Generally, section 504 prohibits discrimination
against qualified individuals with disabilities in any program or
activity receiving federal financial assistance.42 Thus, a school or
38 See 56 Fed. Reg. at 35,554 ("The use of a lay board or other mechanism does
not itself remove the ADA's religious exemption.").
39 id.
'0 See id. (citing, as examples, private independent day care programs and local
community groups as subject to the ADA if a lease exists and consideration is paid
thereupon).
41 See 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1994)) ("No otherwise qualified individual with a disabil-
ity in the United States ... shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded
from ... participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance."). See gener-
ally Ronald D. Wenkart, Providing a Free Appropriate Education Under Section
504, 65 ED. LAW. REP. 1021 (1991) (outlining the history, statutory language and
regulations relevant to section 504).
42 See 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1994). To successfully prosecute a cause of action under
the Rehabilitation Act a plaintiff must prove four elements: 1) that he suffers from a
disability; 2) he is otherwise qualified for participation in the program; 3) he is being
excluded from participation in, being denied the benefits of, or being subjected to
discrimination under the program solely by reason of his disability; and 4) the pro-
gram or activity is receiving federal funding. See Rhodes v. Ohio High Sch. Athletic
Ass'n, 939 F. Supp. 584, 588 (N.D. Ohio 1996) (citing Sandison v. Michigan High
Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 64 F.3d 1026, 1030-31 (6th Cir. 1995)). Currently, section 504
prohibits discrimination only by recipients of federal financial assistance. See H.R.
REP. NO. 101-485 (II), 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 84 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 267, 366. Section 504 is also applicable to employment discrimination.
See Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Darrone, 465 U.S. 624, 626 (1984); see also 28 C.F.R.
§ 41.52 (a) (1994) ("No qualified handicapped person shall, on the basis of handicap,
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social service agency receiving federal funds will be subject to
section 504. 43 If a school enrolls students who participate in fed-
erally funded programs operated by a local public school district,
e.g., Titles I and VI of the Elementary or Secondary Education
Act, under administrative interpretations of the Office of Civil
Rights ("OCR") of the U.S. Department of Education, the school
may be indirectly subject to the substantive requirements of the
section 504 regulations even though it is not a direct recipient of
funds." This rationale follows from the public school district's
inability to provide program services in private schools that dis-
criminate against beneficiaries of the public school district's fed-
45
erally funded program.
When confronted with the question of whether section 504
applies to a Catholic institution, particularly with regard to a
Catholic school, two factors are to be considered. First, it is es-
sential to determine in which federally funded programs the in-
stitution, or its beneficiaries, participate. Second, the manner of
participation must be considered. These are critical to determin-
ing whether the institution is a "recipient" under the applicable
section 504 regulations. Greater obligations are imposed on an
institution that is a "recipient" under the regulations than an in-
stitution that is not itself a recipient, but whose clients or em-
ployees are beneficiaries of a federally funded program operated
by a governmental entity or third party.
be subjected to discrimination in employment under any program or activity that
receives or benefits from federal financial assistance.").
For example, participation in a school lunch program or community develop-
ment block grant program would bring a school or social agency within the ambit of
section 504. See, e.g., United States v. University Hosp. of State Univ., 575 F. Supp.
607, 612 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), affd, 729 F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding that a hospital
receiving Medicare or Medicaid reimbursement is subject to the prohibition of dis-
crimination); Rogers v. Frito-Lay Inc., 433 F. Supp. 200, 204 (N.D. Tex. 1977), affd,
611 F.2d 1074 (5th Cir. 1980) (clarifying that grant assistance must go primarily to
public entities to fall within section 504, and specifically excluding government pro-
curement contracts).
" See 34 C.F.R. §§ 104.1-.61 (containing the Department of Education's regula-
tions pertaining to the applicability of section 504); see also Jacobson v. Delta Air-
lines, Inc., 742 F.2d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that an indirect receipt of
federal assistance is within the scope of the Rehabilitation Act).
'5 See 34 C.F.R. § 104.4(b)(v) (1997). See generally Laura F. Rothstein, Section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act: Emerging Issues for Colleges and Universities, 13 J.C.
& U.L. 229 (1986) (reviewing emerging issues under the Rehabilitation Act that are
applicable to schools and students).
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A. Recipient Institutions
Generally, an institution will be considered a recipient if it
receives, through grants, loans or other arrangements, federal
financial assistance, directly or through another recipient, in the
form of funds, or real or personal property." Examples of such
intermediary recipients would include a social service agency re-
ceiving a grant from the Department of Housing and Urban De-
velopment, or a school receiving school lunch funds from the De-
partment of Agriculture.
The Department of Health and Human Services regulations
implementing section 504 mandate that qualified individuals
with disabilities not be excluded from participating in a recipi-
ent's program because its facilities are inaccessible to, or unus-
able by, persons with physical disabilities. 7 Institutions must
make their programs readily accessible to individuals with dis-
abilities. For example, this may be accomplished by the redes-
igning of equipment, reassigning of classes or other services,
home visits, delivery of services at alternate sites, and physical
alteration of existing facilities.4'  Newly constructed facilities
must be designed and constructed so that the facility is readily
accessible to, and usable by, handicapped persons with disabili-
ties. 4' Recipients are not required to make every facility or every
There is no statutory definition of "recipient" of federal financial assistance.
The Department of Justice, however, has defined "recipient" as "any State or its po-
litical subdivision, any instrumentality of a State or its political subdivision, any
public or private agency, institution, organization, or other entity, or any person to
which Federal financial assistance is extended directly or through another recipient
... but excluding the ultimate beneficiary of the assistance." 28 C.F.R. § 41.3(d)
(1997); see also Lundstedt v. City of Miami, No. 93-1402-CIV, 1995 WL 852443, at
*13 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 11, 1995) (judging a retirement trust to be an entity recipient,
and thus subjecting it to the provisions of the Rehabilitation Act).
The Department of Health and Human Services has defined "recipient" in a
manner identical to its own regulations. See 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(f) (1996).
47 See 45 C.F.R. § 84.21 (1996). See generally Jonathan C. Drimmer, Cripples,
Overcomers, and Civil Rights: Tracing the Evolution of Federal Legislation and So-
cial Policy for People with Disabilities, 40 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1341, 1359-75 (1993)
(discussing the evolution and treatment of people with disabilities under Federal
law).
" See 45 C.F.R. § 84.22 (1996); see also Chai R. Feldblum, The Americans with
Disabilities Act: Planning for Compliance, 412 PLI=LIT 23 (1991). See generally Lisa
Lluggins, You Can Get There From Here: Program Accessibility Requirements Under
the Americans with Disabilities Act, 56 ALA. LAW. 363, 364 (1995) (providing a gen-
eral overview of accessibility requirements).
9 See 45 C.F.R. § 84.23(a) (1996) (explaining "Design and construction" re-
quirements). Recipients under the statute need not make every facility or every part
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part of a facility accessible." Rather, viewed in its entirety, a
recipient's programs and activities must be readily accessible.'
New construction and alterations begun after June 2, 1977 must
also be consistent with the Uniform Federal Accessibility Stan-
dards."
Regulations under section 504 apply to employment prac-
tices as well, including recruitment, hiring, promotions, job clas-
sifications, compensation, and fringe benefits. 3 Organizations
that receive federal financial assistance must make reasonable
accommodations for the physical and mental limitations of oth-
erwise qualified employees with disabilities unless the organiza-
tion can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an
undue hardship on its operations." The need to make reason-
able accommodations may not be used to justify denial of em-
ployment opportunities.55 Reasonable accommodations may in-
clude making facilities physically accessible, job restructuring,
part-time or modified work schedules, acquisition or modification
of equipment, provision of readers or interpreters, and other
similar actions.56 Additionally, recipients of federal funding
of a facility accessible. See 45 C.F.R. § 84.22(a) (1996) ('A recipient shall operate
each program or activity ... so that the program or activity, when viewed in its en-
tirety, is readily accessible to handicapped persons.").
'0 See 45 C.F.R. § 84.22(a) (1996).
51 See id.
62 See 45 C.F.R. § 84.23(c)(1) (1996) ('Effective as of January 18, 1991, design,
construction, or alteration of buildings in conformance with sections 3-8 of the Uni-
form Federal Accessibility Standards ... shall be deemed to comply with the re-
quirements of this section .... ").
' See 45 C.F.R. §§ 84.11-.14 (1996); see also Cheryl D. Fells, Employee Benefit
Plan Implications of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 714 PLICORP. 117 (1990).
See generally Maureen O'Connor, Defining 'Handicap' for Purposes of Employment
Discrimination, 30 ARIz. L. REV. 633 (1988) (discussing various judicial interpreta-
tions of "handicap").
5' See 45 C.F.R. § 84.12 (1997) (describing the "Reasonable Accommodations"
requirements that an organization receiving federal financial assistance must im-
plement); see also School Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 289 (1987) (holding that an
elementary school teacher was handicapped under section 504); Stephen B. Epstein,
In Search of a Bright Line: Determining When an Employer's Financial Hardship
Becomes "Undue" Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 48 VAND. L. REV. 391,
405-45 (1995) (discussing the "undue hardship" requirement of the Rehabilitation
Act of 1974 and concluding that it is a vague standard).
'5 See 45 C.F.R. § 84.12(d) (1996) (stating that an employer may not deny em-
ployment to a disabled person in order to prevent making reasonable accommoda-
tions); see also Arline,, 480 U.S. at 289 n.19 (reasoning that an employer has an af-
firmative obligation to make reasonable accommodation for a handicapped
employee).
16 See 45 C.F.R. § 84.12(b) (1996) (providing a list for employers of reasonable
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must comply with certain procedural requirements such as no-
tice requirements, self-evaluations, and adoption of grievance
procedures.57
In the area of education, physical accessibility has been a
source of concern to some Catholic educators, particularly in the
Northeast where a large number of administrative complaints
have been filed with OCR Regional Offices alleging that nonpub-
lic school facilities are not accessible. 5 However, section 504's
impact on educational institutions is not limited to the accessibil-
ity requirements. Students with disabilities must be placed in
the regular educational environment unless it can be demon-
strated that the education of the student, with the use of sup-
plementary aids and services, cannot be achieved satisfactorily.5 9
Private schools that operate special education programs are re-
quired to follow evaluation, placement, and procedural safeguard
procedures for students with disabilities specified in the regula-
tions.6°
It should be noted that the regulations do not require a pri-
vate school to put in place special education services for children
with disabilities if the school does not normally offer special edu-
cation programs to meet those needs. A private school, however,
must serve a child with a disability if the child is able to partici-
pate in the regular program with minor adjustments in the
manner in which the program is normally offered.6' Defining the
accommodations); see also John R. Byers, Cook v. Rhode Islan& It's Not Over Until
the Morbidly Obese Woman Works, 20 J. CORP. LAW 389, 408 (1995) (discussing how
an employer may have to accommodate obese employees).
57 See 45 C.F.R. §§ 84.6-.8 (1996) (reciting procedures that must be followed in
filini a complaint).
The focus of this part of the article is on private elementary and secondary
schools that have generated the vast majority of inquiries. Section 504 regulations
have separate provisions for institutions of higher education. See 34 C.F.R. §§
104.41-.47 (1997).
59 See 34 C.F.R. § 104.34(a) (1997) (stating the requirement that a disabled per-
son should be educated in a regular classroom if at all possible); see also Oberti v.
Board of Educ., 995 F.2d 1204, 1223 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding that a school district
failed to prove that a child with Down Syndrome could not be educated in a regular
classroom with supplementary aids and services); D.F. v. Western Sch. Corp., 921 F.
Supp. 559, 566 (S.D. Ind. 1996) (stating that qualified handicapped children must be
educated with nonhandicapped children to the 'maximum extent appropriate").
60 See 34 C.F.R. § 104.39 (1997) (stating that private schools that receive federal
funds must also follow the regulations).
61 See 34 C.F.R. § 104.39(a) (1997) (stating a private school must make minor
adjustments to accommodate the disabled child); see also Joseph F. Smith, Jr. & M.
Kay Runyan, How Private Secondary Schools Can Meet Their Obligation to Accom-
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term "minor adjustment" is problematic and unfortunately nei-
ther the regulations, nor the analysis,62 defines the term or offers
clear guidance. It is safe to assume that minor adjustments
would include such things as (i) moving classroom assignments
from one floor to another; (ii) allowing students time off for re-
curring medical treatments; (iii) accommodating parentally-
compensated sign interpreters for students with hearing defi-
ciencies; and (iv) allowing extra time to complete assignments or
tests. Case law addressing what constitutes a "minor adjust-
ment" is virtually nonexistent and, consequently, few clear-cut
answers exist. It should also be noted that the regulations allow
private schools to charge more for providing services to students
with disabilities to the extent that the additional charge can be
justified by a significant increase in costs.1
When problems in this area arise, the school personnel or
Diocesan attorneys should be advised of section 504's require-
ments. Mere explanation of the legal requirements, however,
would be insufficient. Such parties should also be urged to en-
courage schools to do everything possible to serve children with
disabilities, while recognizing and taking into consideration the
reality of their limited resources. The ultimate goal is for all
schools to be as inclusive as possible, rather than focusing on the
bare minimum legal requirements. This approach is fully consis-
tent with Catholic teachings in this area. Furthermore, this ap-
proach is wise from a legal point of view as well. By being as in-
clusive as possible, a school is not likely to run afoul of the minor
adjustment test.6
modate Students with Specific Learning Disabilities, 17 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 77,
82-90 (1995) (discussing how students who attend private schools can be given ac-
commodation for their specific disability).62 See 34 C.F.R. pt. 104, app. A, para. 28.
6' See 34 C.F.R. § 104.39(b) (1997) (allowing private schools to charge for addi-
tional services).
"Private schools and parents of children in private schools should be advised
that according to the Individuals With Disabilities Education Act ('IDEA"), state
and local public school districts are required to identify, evaluate and provide spe-
cial educational services to children with disabilities enrolled in private schools. See
20 U.S.C. § 1413(g) (Supp. 1998). In the past, disputes have arisen with regard to
the U.S. Department of Education's interpretation of the extent and location of
services that public schools must provide. In 1997 Congress amended IDEA to clar-
ify that local public school districts are only required to spend a proportionate
amount of their federal IDEA funds on services for children with disabilities in pri-
vate schools. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(A)(i)(I). The practical effect of the amend-
ment is that many private school children will not receive services because IDEA
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B. When a Non-Recipient Institution Is Indirectly Subject to the
Substantive Requirements of Section 504
In many federal education programs, federal funds are pro-
vided by grant to state and local public school agencies to imple-
ment the federal program. Often the operative statute will re-
quire the public agency to provide educational services to private
elementary and secondary school students and teachers.' For
example, under Title VI of the Elementary and Secondary Edu-
cation Act of 1965 ("ESEA"), a local public school agency may
provide computers, software, and library materials for use by
private school students.6 The public school agency retains own-
ership and title to the equipment and materials even though
they are placed at the private school for use by the students.
As a result, the crucial issue to be resolved becomes whether
the private school is a recipient of federal financial assistance
within the meaning of section 504. In this type of situation, the
OCR has consistently taken the position that the local public
school district, not the private school, is the recipient. This
does not mean, however, that the private school is not affected by
section 504 and its regulations. The OCR has consistently held
that the private school is indirectly subject to the substantive re-
quirements of the regulations. The local public school agency, as
a recipient, is prohibited under section 104.4(b)(1)(v) of the
regulations from assisting any third party, such as a private
school, that acts discriminatorily on the basis of disability while
provides less than ten percent of the cost of providing special education services.
6' See generally Allan G. Osborne, Jr., Providing Special Education Services to
Handicapped Parochial School Students, 42 ED. LAW REP. 1041 (1988) (discussing
how the Education for All Handicapped Children Act states that public schools re-
ceiving federal funds must provide special education for handicapped children in
private schools).
66 See Pub. L. No. 89-750 § 161 (Title VI), 80 Stat. 1191 (1966); see also Neal
Devins & James B. Stedman, New Federalism in Education: The Meaning of the
Chicago School Desegregation Cases, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1243, 1246-48 (1984)
(addressing the history and impact of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act
of 1965); Mark C. Weber, The Transformation of the Education of the Handicapped
Act: A Study in the Interpretation of Radical Statutes, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 349,
355-66 (1990) (discussing same).
617 See supra notes 65-66.
68 There is one reported case, Thomas v. Davidson Academy, 846 F. Supp. 611
(M.D. Tenn. 1994), that held, without discussion of recipient/nonrecipient status,
that a nonreligious private school participating in Title VI programs was subject to
section 504. See id. at 618. Two unreported decisions have also concluded that pri-
vate religious schools whose students receive Title VI services are recipients for the
purposes of the regulations.
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providing services to beneficiaries."' Unfortunately, the OCR has
not defined with any clarity what constitutes "substantive," and
what does not. Nonetheless, private schools can be subjected to
the substantive requirements of section 504 regulations despite
the fact that they are not recipients of federal financial assis-
tance."
The distinction between recipient status and nonrecipient
status, therefore, is crucial. In the example cited above, the pri-
vate school, as a nonrecipient, would not be subjected to nonsub-
stantive requirements of the regulations; as a recipient, the local
public school agency would be. Furthermore, while investigating
discrimination complaints brought against the private school,
the OCR will focus on the federally funded program. Conse-
quently, in the example cited above, the OCR would investigate
whether all rooms utilizing Title VI materials and equipment,
whether all common areas such as restrooms and cafeterias, and
whether ingress and egress to and from the private school
building are physically accessible to students with disabilities.
C. Administrative Complaints Filed with the OCR
This section does not provide in detail how the OCR con-
ducts investigations of complaints,7' but rather makes general
comments on the complaint process. First, almost anyone can
file a complaint with the OCR alleging discrimination in a fed-
erally funded program.72 Judicial concepts of standing do not
apply. A resident of one state can file a complaint against a
school in another state in which the complainant has no connec-
69 See id.
70 See Smith, Jr. & Runyan, supra note 61, at 92-94 (discussing how private
nonreligious schools not receiving federal funds have to accommodate students with
specific learning disabilities pursuant to Title III of the Americans with Disabilities
Act of 1990); see also Michael Heise, Public Funds, Private Schools and the Court:
Legal Issues and Policy Consequences, 25 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 137, 137 (1993)
(stating that private schools may have to succumb to the requirements of section
504 when they receive a small amount of funding from the state).
71 The focus here is on the administrative process because that is where much of
the recent activity has occurred. It should also be noted that a private cause of ac-
tion under section 504 has been recognized by the courts and in many instances an
exhaustion of administrative remedies was not required. See Tuck v. HCA Health
Services of Tenn., Inc., 842 F. Supp. 988, 991 (M.D. Tenn. 1992), affd, 7 F.3d 465
(6th Cir. 1993).
72 See 28 C.F.R. § 35.170 (1997) (stating any person who believes that he or she
or a specific class of persons has been discriminated against can file a complaint).
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tion whatsoever;7" if the proper allegations are made, the OCR
will investigate. Second, the OCR will request, often through the
local public school district, information regarding federally
funded programs at the private school or schools involved. 4 Af-
ter this initial investigation, an on-site visit will often follow.75
Finally, the OCR prefers to resolve issues informally through ne-
gotiations rather than initiate proceedings to cut off federal
funding.7" These informal negotiations, however, may be pro-
tracted.
The mechanisms of applying the ADA and section 504 to
church-related institutions are complex. There are, however,
general guidelines that should be adhered to while analyzing and
responding to questions arising under the ADA and section 504.
First, it must be noted that the general prohibition on the basis
of disability in employment practices in Title I of the ADA does
apply to church-related employers with 15 or more employees.
Second, under Title II of the ADA, church-related institutions
that participate in programs operated by or implemented
through state or local governmental agencies will likely be re-
quired by those agencies to prohibit discrimination on the basis
of a disability or face termination from the programs. Third, Ti-
tle III of the ADA does not apply to religious organizations or
entities controlled by religious organizations.
Moreover, section 504 will apply, directly or indirectly, to
church-related institutions that participate in federally funded
7 See 28 C.F.R. § 35.171 (1997) (establishing procedures to process a complaint
even though it was filed with a federally funded agency without proper jurisdiction).
74 See 34 C.F.R. § 100.6(c) (1997) (stating that any recipient of federal funds
must allow a department official access to information pertinent to an investiga-
tion). See generally Arthur R. Block, Enforcement of Title VI Compliance Agreements
by Third Party Beneficiaries, 18 HARV C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 13-14 (1983) (discussing
generally how the OCR has investigated in the past).
7r See Robert M. Hendrickson, et al., The Impact of the Civil Rights Restoration
Act on Higher Education, 60 ED. LAW REP. 671, 673-75 (1990) (discussing a federal
agency's procedure in investigating discrimination); see also Adam A. Milani, Dis-
abled Students in Higher Education: Administrative and Judicial Enforcement of
Disability Law, 22 J.C. & U.L. 989, 993 n.18 (1996) (exploring the procedure the
OCR follows when investigating discrimination under section 504).
76 See 34 C.F.R. § 100.7(d)(1) (1997) (stating that if an investigation indicates
noncompliance the Department official will inform the recipient of the federal funds
that the dispute will be resolved by informal means wherever possible); see also
Maijorie A. Silver, The Uses and Abuses of Informal Procedures in Federal Civil
Rights Enforcement, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 482, 516-17 (1987) (examining the pro-
cedures that the OCR officials follow in an attempt to settle the dispute informally).
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programs. Before the responsibilities of any particular institu-
tion can be determined, it is essential to ascertain in which fed-
erally funded programs, if any, the institution participates and
the manner of participation. Finally, it must be noted that the
ADA and section 504 overlap in many areas and must be dealt
with appropriately.
These general guidelines provide a basic framework for de-
termining whether the ADA or section 504, or both, may apply to
a church-related institution in any particular situation. Once it
is determined that one or both apply, the relevant regulations,
guidance, and case law need to be researched. The legal ramifi-
cations can then be evaluated. As indicated above, the inquiry
should not stop with identification of the minimum legal re-
quirements. The ultimate goal is to ensure that our Catholic in-
stitutions and their services are open and available to all persons
with disabilities.
